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\section*{Supplementary information not intended for publication}
In this appendix, we present detailed empirical results from various robustness checks. Many of these robustness checks were suggested by the anonymous reviewers, and we are extremely grateful for their constructive comments on the earlier version of this article. The following table of contents provides a link to each of the robustness checks. 
\tableofcontents


\clearpage


\section{Using FDI as a percentage of GDP as the dependent variable}

We run the same models using a different FDI measure. We find empirical support for our hypotheses in general. However, in the presidential-democracy only sample, the coefficient estimate of $\textsc{election proximity}^2$ is negative, which is consistent with our expectation, but fails to reach the statistical significance. FDI as a percentage of GDP contains information regarding the size of a country's economy, which can be partially captured by control variables such as $\textsc{economic development}$ or $\textsc{market size}$. Excluding either control variable does not change our initial findings meaningfully.\footnote{In the presidential-democracy only sample, the coefficient estimate of $\textsc{election proximity}^2$ gains statistical significance when we exclude either $\textsc{economic development}$ or $\textsc{market size}$.} 

\begin{table}[H]
\begin{center}
     \caption{Effect of Political Cycle on FDI (\% of GDP)} \label{fdigdp}
     \scriptsize
     \begin{tabular}{lcccccc}
     \hline\hline
 \hspace{0.1cm} 				 & (1) & (2) & (3) & (4) & (5) & (6) \\
				 &  &  & (Semi) & (Semi) &  &  \\
				 Sample:& Autocracy & Autocracy & Presidential & Presidential & Presidential & Presidential \\
				Estimator: & PCSE & Driscoll-Kraay & PCSE & Driscoll-Kraay & PCSE & Driscoll-Kraay \\

\hline\\

				Tenure & 0.993* & 0.840* &  &  &  & \\
				 & (0.559) & (0.431) &  &  &  & \\
				Tenure$^2$ & -0.340** & -0.291** &  &  &  & \\
				 & (0.165) & (0.117) &  &  &  & \\
				Election Proximity &  &  & 0.294 & 0.211 & 0.265* & 0.332\\
				 &  &  & (0.192) & (0.221) & (0.139) & (0.256)\\
				Election Proximity$^2$ &  &  & -0.191** & -0.171* & -0.099 & -0.136\\
				 &  &  & (0.092) & (0.098) & (0.067) & (0.114)\\
				Economic Development & 2.740 & 1.731 & 1.961*** & 1.461** & 1.273** & 1.004\\
				 & (1.735) & (1.359) & (0.678) & (0.597) & (0.581) & (0.615)\\
				Economic Growth & 0.040* & 0.049 & 0.037** & 0.054** & 0.003 & 0.014\\
				 & (0.023) & (0.034) & (0.016) & (0.022) & (0.013) & (0.011)\\
				Market Size & 2.973*** & 2.507*** & 1.928*** & 1.537** & 2.593*** & 2.335***\\
				 & (0.811) & (0.854) & (0.563) & (0.627) & (0.547) & (0.520)\\
				Trade Openness & -0.009 & 0.002 & 0.034*** & 0.037** & 0.019*** & 0.021**\\
				 & (0.009) & (0.005) & (0.011) & (0.015) & (0.007) & (0.008)\\
				BIT & 0.450 & 0.694*** & 0.220 & 0.413 & 0.438* & 0.606**\\
				 & (0.328) & (0.183) & (0.296) & (0.447) & (0.264) & (0.226)\\
				Financial Openness & 0.200 & 0.285 & 0.344*** & 0.335** & 0.315*** & 0.333***\\
				 & (0.238) & (0.178) & (0.092) & (0.142) & (0.082) & (0.056)\\
				Resource Rents & -0.349* & -0.218 & -0.482* & -0.410*** & -0.598*** & -0.698***\\
				 & (0.182) & (0.217) & (0.265) & (0.120) & (0.161) & (0.232)\\
				Intrastate War & -1.347* & -1.185** & 0.302 & 0.505** & 0.080 & 0.227\\
				 & (0.692) & (0.524) & (0.251) & (0.244) & (0.268) & (0.264)\\
				Domestic Instability & 0.025 & -0.003 & -0.011 & -0.036 & -0.008 & -0.015\\
				 & (0.040) & (0.025) & (0.024) & (0.027) & (0.018) & (0.019)\\
				Constant & -55.428*** & -34.172*** & -41.764*** & -26.137*** & -42.005*** & -28.714***\\
				 & (14.883) & (9.540) & (9.371) & (6.191) & (8.346) & (5.380)\\ \\
				Observations & 2,050 & 2,050 & 1,081 & 1,081 & 656 & 656\\
				Number of Countries & 96 & 96 & 59 & 59 & 30 & 30\\
\hline\hline\\

\multicolumn{7} {l}
{\parbox[h][.17in][c]{5.6in} {\scriptsize{\textbf{Note}: All columns include country-specific fixed effects. (not reported). $^{*}$ p$<$0.10; $^{**}$ p$<$0.05; $^{***}$ p$<$0.01. (two-tailed tests)}}}
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\end{table}



\section{Electoral FDI cycle in parliamentary democracies}


\begin{table}[H]
\begin{center}
     \caption{Effect of Legislative Election Cycle on FDI Inflows in Parliamentary Democracies} \label{parliamentary}
     \scriptsize
     \begin{tabular}{lcccc}
     \hline\hline
 \hspace{0.1cm} 				 & (1) & (2) & (3) & (4) \\
				Estimator: & PCSE & Driscoll-Kraay & PCSE & Driscoll-Kraay \\

\hline\\

				Election Proximity & 0.382 & 0.311 &  & \\
				& (0.410) & (0.400) &  & \\
				Election Proximity$^2$ & -0.249 & -0.206 &  & \\
				& (0.270) & (0.266) &  & \\
				Election Quantile &  &  & 0.124 & 0.130\\
				&  &  & (0.736) & (0.626)\\
				Election Quantile$^2$ &  &  & -0.006 & -0.075\\
				&  &  & (0.707) & (0.544)\\
				Economic Development & 2.250** & 2.318*** & 2.219** & 2.354***\\
				& (0.879) & (0.567) & (0.911) & (0.618)\\
				Economic Growth & 0.002 & 0.005 & -0.001 & 0.001\\
				& (0.024) & (0.024) & (0.026) & (0.027)\\
				Market Size & 2.845*** & 2.785*** & 2.984*** & 2.867***\\
				& (0.956) & (0.884) & (0.994) & (0.928)\\
				Trade Openness & 0.015* & 0.014** & 0.015* & 0.014**\\
				& (0.008) & (0.006) & (0.008) & (0.006)\\
				BIT & 1.207*** & 1.223*** & 1.216*** & 1.229***\\
				& (0.423) & (0.378) & (0.442) & (0.398)\\
				Financial Openness & 0.090 & 0.094 & 0.083 & 0.092\\
				& (0.115) & (0.091) & (0.118) & (0.095)\\
				Resource Rents & -0.060 & -0.060 & -0.058 & -0.063\\
				& (0.128) & (0.091) & (0.130) & (0.094)\\
				Intrastate War & 0.031 & 0.083 & 0.031 & 0.073\\
				& (0.314) & (0.252) & (0.329) & (0.287)\\
				Domestic Instability & 0.026 & 0.030 & 0.029 & 0.035\\
				& (0.031) & (0.023) & (0.032) & (0.021)\\
				Constant & -49.924*** & -44.004*** &  & -45.061***\\
				& (10.024) & (8.486) &  & (9.286)\\
				Observations & 786 & 786 & 758 & 758\\
				Number of Countries & 32 & 32 & 32 & 32\\
\hline\hline\\

\multicolumn{5} {l}
{\parbox[h][.47in][c]{4.0in} {\scriptsize{\textbf{Note}: \textit{Election Proximity} and \textit{Election Quantile} in parliamentary democracies is calculated based on legislative elections rather than executive elections. All columns include country-specific fixed effects. (not reported). $^{*}$ p$<$0.10; $^{**}$ p$<$0.05; $^{***}$ p$<$0.01. (two-tailed tests)}}}
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\end{table}




\section{Electoral FDI cycle in autocracies}



\begin{table}[H]
\begin{center}
     \caption{Effect of Executive Election Cycle on FDI Inflows in Autocracies} \label{autoelect}
     \scriptsize
     \begin{tabular}{lcccc}
     \hline\hline
 \hspace{0.1cm} 				 & (1) & (2) & (3) & (4) \\
				Estimator: & PCSE & Driscoll-Kraay & PCSE & Driscoll-Kraay \\

\hline\\

				Election Proximity & -0.245 & -0.221 &  & \\
				 & (0.151) & (0.161) &  & \\
				Election Proximity$^2$ & 0.106** & 0.098** &  & \\
				 & (0.052) & (0.040) &  & \\
				Election Quantile &  &  & 0.030 & 0.232\\
				 &  &  & (0.581) & (0.560)\\
				Election Quantile$^2$ &  &  & -0.085 & -0.231\\
				 &  &  & (0.559) & (0.477)\\
				Economic Development & 1.148*** & 0.933*** & 1.015** & 1.003**\\
				 & (0.326) & (0.320) & (0.406) & (0.438)\\
				Economic Growth & 0.017*** & 0.026*** & 0.019*** & 0.029***\\
				 & (0.005) & (0.005) & (0.006) & (0.007)\\
				Market Size & 2.371*** & 2.165*** & 2.719*** & 2.539***\\
				 & (0.409) & (0.547) & (0.411) & (0.584)\\
				Trade Openness & -0.000 & 0.001 & 0.001 & 0.004\\
				 & (0.003) & (0.002) & (0.004) & (0.003)\\
				BIT & 0.866*** & 1.180*** & 0.522** & 0.786***\\
				 & (0.222) & (0.207) & (0.237) & (0.177)\\
				Financial Openness & 0.357*** & 0.364*** & 0.317*** & 0.312***\\
				 & (0.076) & (0.054) & (0.089) & (0.069)\\
				Resource Rents & 0.063 & 0.135 & -0.015 & 0.026\\
				 & (0.105) & (0.091) & (0.115) & (0.102)\\
				Intrastate War & -0.392* & -0.718*** & -0.539** & -0.705**\\
				 & (0.218) & (0.209) & (0.248) & (0.280)\\
				Domestic Instability & -0.019 & -0.037** & -0.021 & -0.021\\
				 & (0.013) & (0.014) & (0.016) & (0.017)\\
				Constant &  & -24.341*** &  & -28.069***\\
				 &  & (4.195) &  & (4.460)\\
				Observations & 2,090 & 2,090 & 1,556 & 1,556\\
				Number of Countries & 90 & 90 & 70 & 70\\
\hline\hline\\

\multicolumn{5} {l}
{\parbox[h][.17in][c]{4.0in} {\scriptsize{\textbf{Note}: All columns include country-specific fixed effects. (not reported). $^{*}$ p$<$0.10; $^{**}$ p$<$0.05; $^{***}$ p$<$0.01. (two-tailed tests)}}}
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\end{table}




\section{Controlling for party information}

The literature suggests that the preferences and ideological orientation of political parties are critical determinants of political business cycle \citep{Hibbs77,Hibbs87,Alesina87,AlesinaRosenthal1995,Alexinaetal97,Franzese02,BloombergHess03}. These partisan cycle theories indicate that a government's economic policy agenda is more likely to change by the shift of incumbent partisanship than that of the incumbent leadership. Particularly regarding FDI and government partisanship, a government with a left-leaning party was found to be more likely to adopt open investment regimes \citep{pinto2013partisan}. Thus, we check the robustness of our results controlling for variables that contain partisan information of the incumbent party: (1) \textsc{incumbent party age} that records how long the incumbent party has been in office, (2) \textsc{party control} that indicates whether the incumbent party controls all relevant houses in a given year, and (3) \textsc{party orientation} that records whether the incumbent party is right-wing (1), centrist (2), or left-wing (3). The information for these variables is taken from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) \citep{DPI}.\footnote{The presidential-democracy sample is also determined by the DPI coding rule.} We still find that \textsc{election proximity} has a significant inverted U-shaped relationship with FDI, which supports Hypothesis 1. 


\begin{table}[H]
\begin{center}
     \caption{Effect of Executive Election Cycle on FDI in Presidential Democracies with Party Information} \label{party}
     \scriptsize
     \begin{tabular}{lcccc}
     \hline\hline
 \hspace{0.1cm} 				 & (1) & (2) & (3) & (4) \\
				 DV: & FDI Inflows & FDI Inflows & FDI (\% of GDP) & FDI (\% of GDP) \\
				Estimator: & PCSE & Driscoll-Kraay & PCSE & Driscoll-Kraay \\

\hline\\

				Election Proximity & 0.323** & 0.381*** & 0.316 & 0.297*\\
				& (0.144) & (0.115) & (0.201) & (0.171)\\
				Election Proximity$^2$ & -0.176*** & -0.193*** & -0.151 & -0.113*\\
				& (0.064) & (0.060) & (0.119) & (0.060)\\
				Economic Development & 2.434*** & 2.372*** & 2.023*** & 1.602*\\
				& (0.495) & (0.369) & (0.712) & (0.812)\\
				Economic Growth & 0.004 & 0.009 & 0.010 & 0.017\\
				& (0.017) & (0.008) & (0.017) & (0.013)\\
				Market Size & 2.306** & 1.932** & 2.846*** & 2.630***\\
				& (1.077) & (0.763) & (0.734) & (0.589)\\
				Trade Openness & 0.021*** & 0.022*** & 0.023*** & 0.031***\\
				& (0.006) & (0.005) & (0.009) & (0.011)\\
				BIT & 0.734** & 0.876*** & 0.263 & 0.348\\
				& (0.312) & (0.254) & (0.305) & (0.218)\\
				Financial Openness & 0.176 & 0.172*** & 0.248*** & 0.213**\\
				& (0.114) & (0.049) & (0.093) & (0.089)\\
				Resource Rents & -0.364** & -0.503*** & -0.518*** & -0.753**\\
				& (0.157) & (0.127) & (0.185) & (0.281)\\
				Intrastate War & -0.706* & -0.854* & -0.404 & -0.281\\
				& (0.426) & (0.440) & (0.365) & (0.256)\\
				Domestic Instability & -0.016 & -0.014 & -0.006 & -0.035\\
				& (0.022) & (0.019) & (0.024) & (0.025)\\
				Duration of Executive Party in Office & 0.001 & 0.001** & 0.002* & 0.002**\\
				& (0.001) & (0.000) & (0.001) & (0.001)\\
				Executive Party Control of Houses & -0.014 & -0.084 & 0.272 & 0.136\\
				& (0.168) & (0.104) & (0.207) & (0.169)\\
				Executive Party Ideology (Right $\sim$ Left) & -0.055 & -0.104 & -0.067 & -0.061\\
				& (0.113) & (0.074) & (0.097) & (0.100)\\
				Constant & -42.109*** & -33.036*** & -53.273*** & -36.386***\\
				& (12.441) & (6.722) & (11.562) & (8.246)\\
				Observations & 577 & 577 & 577 & 577\\
				Number of Countries & 43 & 43 & 43 & 43\\
				\hline\hline\\

\multicolumn{5} {l}
{\parbox[h][.27in][c]{5.3in} {\scriptsize{\textbf{Note}: All control variables are lagged by one year except economic growth, duration of executive party in office, executive party control of houses, and executive party ideology. All columns include country-specific fixed effects. (not reported). $^{*}$ p$<$0.10; $^{**}$ p$<$0.05; $^{***}$ p$<$0.01. (two-tailed tests)}}}
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\end{table}





\section{Institutional variations within presidential democracies}

Investors may be less concerned about political uncertainty in democracies where institutional checks and balance are well-established. That is, in mature democracies, a leader might be more constrained in his or her ability to reverse the existing course of economic policies in an unexpected or idiosyncratic way. We test this conjecture in multiple ways.  

\begin{enumerate}
\item We rerun main models controlling for $\textsc{regime age}$\footnote{Main findings hold using a log-transformation of this variable.} or $\textsc{mature democracy}$. The measure of democratic regime age is taken from \citet{DDR10}. Mature democracy is coded as one when a presidential democracy's regime age is greater than five years. We also use two different thresholds (four and six years) to check the robustness of empirical results.   
\item We split our presidential democracy sample into mature and nascent democracies using the regime age thresholds, and rerun the models.  
\item Finally, we add an interaction term between election proximity and mature democracy to see if the effect of electoral cycle is significantly conditioned by regime maturity, as suggested by R1.  
\end{enumerate}

Table 5 reports the results from the models controlling for democracy age. We find that democracy age does not seem to change our main findings substantially: the coefficient estimates of election proximity variables are significant in a hypothesized direction. Table 6 presents the results for the mature-democracy sample. In five out of six models, we find little evidence that FDI inflows are affected by electoral cycle in mature presidential democracies. In Table 7, interestingly enough, we find that the significant effect of electoral cycle holds in nascent democracies. Similarly, the linear combination tests of the interaction terms in Table 8 show that the significant inverted U-shaped relationship between electoral cycle and FDI disappears for mature democracies, while it remains for nascent democracies. Altogether, we find that our theoretical expectation in Hypothesis 1 holds only for immature democracies, which we think is an extremely interesting and novel finding. 
  

\begin{table}[H]
\begin{center}
     \caption{Effect of Election Proximity on FDI Inflows in (Semi-)Presidential Democracies (controlling for democracy age)} 
     \scriptsize
     \begin{tabular}{lcccc}
     \hline\hline
 \hspace{0.1cm} 				 & (1) & (2) & (3) & (4) \\
				  & (Semi) & (Semi) &  &  \\
				 Sample: & Presidential & Presidential & Presidential & Presidential \\
				Estimator: & PCSE & Driscoll-Kraay & PCSE & Driscoll-Kraay \\

\hline\\

				Election Proximity & 0.590** & 0.819*** & 0.531** & 0.759***\\
				 & (0.242) & (0.238) & (0.237) & (0.227)\\
				Election Proximity$^2$ & -0.360*** & -0.490*** & -0.320** & -0.456***\\
				 & (0.134) & (0.143) & (0.130) & (0.134)\\
				\\
				Regime Age & -0.009 & 0.007 &  & \\
				 & (0.017) & (0.032) &  & \\
				Mature Democracy &  &  & 0.673*** & 0.468*\\
				 &  &  & (0.241) & (0.262)\\
				\\
				Economic Development & 1.921*** & 1.453* & 1.859*** & 1.597***\\
				 & (0.587) & (0.738) & (0.514) & (0.424)\\
				Economic Growth & 0.004 & 0.021 & 0.002 & 0.020\\
				 & (0.018) & (0.019) & (0.018) & (0.019)\\
				Market Size & 4.429*** & 3.996*** & 3.783*** & 3.841***\\
				 & (0.647) & (0.991) & (0.750) & (0.632)\\
				Trade Openness & 0.010 & -0.001 & 0.007 & -0.002\\
				 & (0.009) & (0.013) & (0.009) & (0.012)\\
				BIT & 0.592** & 0.710** & 0.589** & 0.761***\\
				 & (0.296) & (0.307) & (0.288) & (0.217)\\
				Financial Openness & 0.244*** & 0.285*** & 0.237** & 0.283***\\
				 & (0.093) & (0.094) & (0.094) & (0.091)\\
				Resource Rents & -0.303 & -0.268** & -0.286 & -0.250**\\
				 & (0.208) & (0.107) & (0.209) & (0.110)\\
				Intrastate War & -0.048 & -0.305 & -0.015 & -0.234\\
				 & (0.284) & (0.315) & (0.285) & (0.294)\\
				Domestic Instability & -0.008 & -0.025 & -0.004 & -0.019\\
				 & (0.021) & (0.015) & (0.021) & (0.016)\\
				Constant & -62.734*** & -44.442*** & -55.852*** & -44.446***\\
				 & (8.209) & (14.340) & (8.887) & (7.395)\\
				Observations & 1,081 & 1,081 & 1,081 & 1,081\\
				Number of Countries & 59 & 59 & 59 & 59\\
\hline\hline\\

\multicolumn{5} {l}
{\parbox[h][.27in][c]{4.2in} {\scriptsize{\textbf{Note}: All columns include country-specific fixed effects. (not reported). $^{*}$ p$<$0.10; $^{**}$ p$<$0.05; $^{***}$ p$<$0.01. (two-tailed tests)}}}
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\end{table}



\begin{table}[H]
\begin{center}
     \caption{Effect of Political Cycle in \emph{\textbf{Mature}} (Semi-)Presidential Democracies (Split Sample)} 
     \scriptsize
     \begin{tabular}{lcccccc}
     \hline\hline
\\		
 \hspace{0.1cm} 				 & (1) & (2) & (3) & (4) & (5) & (6) \\
\\
				Mature Democracy:& \multicolumn{2}{c}{Regime Age$>$5}  & \multicolumn{2}{c}{Regime Age$>$6} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{Regime Age$>$4} \\
\\				
				Estimator: & PCSE & Driscoll-Kraay & PCSE & Driscoll-Kraay & PCSE & Driscoll-Kraay \\

\hline\\

				Election Proximity & 0.100 & 0.206 & 0.051 & 0.251 & 0.364 & 0.606*\\
				 & (0.232) & (0.210) & (0.401) & (0.341) & (0.386) & (0.355)\\
				Election Proximity$^2$ & -0.071 & -0.135 & -0.047 & -0.164 & -0.256 & -0.415*\\
				 & (0.146) & (0.127) & (0.271) & (0.220) & (0.252) & (0.229)\\
				\\
				Economic Development & 2.111*** & 1.755*** & 2.162*** & 1.815*** & 1.878*** & 1.570**\\
				 & (0.680) & (0.593) & (0.730) & (0.660) & (0.672) & (0.583)\\
				Economic Growth & 0.006 & 0.015 & 0.004 & 0.012 & 0.003 & 0.013\\
				 & (0.021) & (0.026) & (0.023) & (0.026) & (0.022) & (0.025)\\
				Market Size & 3.969*** & 3.950*** & 4.188*** & 4.166*** & 4.142*** & 3.966***\\
				 & (1.074) & (0.767) & (1.101) & (0.827) & (1.029) & (0.726)\\
				Trade Openness & 0.007 & -0.004 & 0.005 & -0.007 & 0.009 & -0.002\\
				 & (0.010) & (0.014) & (0.011) & (0.014) & (0.010) & (0.013)\\
				BIT & 0.476 & 0.696*** & 0.469 & 0.694*** & 0.590* & 0.780***\\
				 & (0.348) & (0.211) & (0.363) & (0.218) & (0.344) & (0.217)\\
				Financial Openness & 0.263** & 0.349*** & 0.270** & 0.360*** & 0.261** & 0.341***\\
				 & (0.118) & (0.122) & (0.125) & (0.124) & (0.119) & (0.121)\\
				Resource Rents & -0.449* & -0.386*** & -0.453* & -0.377*** & -0.417* & -0.350***\\
				 & (0.253) & (0.109) & (0.257) & (0.107) & (0.251) & (0.110)\\
				Intrastate War & -0.342 & -0.194 & -0.336 & -0.090 & -0.533 & -0.503\\
				 & (0.277) & (0.224) & (0.265) & (0.254) & (0.355) & (0.342)\\
				Domestic Instability & -0.007 & -0.009 & -0.006 & -0.008 & -0.009 & -0.014\\
				 & (0.022) & (0.023) & (0.023) & (0.024) & (0.023) & (0.022)\\
				Constant & -58.907*** & -45.913*** & -62.070*** & -48.334*** & -58.980*** & -44.676***\\
				 & (11.916) & (9.055) & (12.417) & (10.302) & (11.712) & (8.597)\\
				Observations & 853 & 853 & 811 & 811 & 893 & 893\\
				Number of Countries & 49 & 49 & 49 & 49 & 54 & 54\\
\hline\hline\\

\multicolumn{7} {l}
{\parbox[h][.17in][c]{5.6in} {\scriptsize{\textbf{Note}: All columns include country-specific fixed effects. (not reported). $^{*}$ p$<$0.10; $^{**}$ p$<$0.05; $^{***}$ p$<$0.01. (two-tailed tests)}}}
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\end{table}





\iffalse

\begin{table}[H]
\begin{center}
     \caption{Effect of Political Cycle in Mature \textbf{Presidential} Democracies (Split Sample)} 
     \scriptsize
     \begin{tabular}{lcccccc}
     \hline\hline
\\		
 \hspace{0.1cm} 				 & (1) & (2) & (3) & (4) & (5) & (6) \\
\\
				Mature Democracy:& \multicolumn{2}{c}{Regime Age$>$5}  & \multicolumn{2}{c}{Regime Age$>$6} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{Regime Age$>$4} \\
\\				
				Estimator: & PCSE & Driscoll-Kraay & PCSE & Driscoll-Kraay & PCSE & Driscoll-Kraay \\

\hline\\

				Election Proximity & 0.180 & 0.417** & 0.159 & 0.581 & 0.535 & 0.921***\\
				 & (0.203) & (0.204) & (0.424) & (0.436) & (0.420) & (0.315)\\
				Election Proximity^2 & -0.110 & -0.204** & -0.101 & -0.324 & -0.366 & -0.593***\\
				 & (0.101) & (0.095) & (0.288) & (0.276) & (0.280) & (0.199)\\
				\\
				Economic Development & 2.924** & 2.373*** & 3.133** & 2.675*** & 2.542** & 2.157***\\
				 & (1.163) & (0.551) & (1.264) & (0.668) & (1.055) & (0.543)\\
				Economic Growth & -0.020 & -0.032 & -0.026 & -0.037 & -0.024 & -0.033\\
				 & (0.028) & (0.025) & (0.030) & (0.025) & (0.029) & (0.023)\\
				Market Size & 3.505** & 3.869*** & 3.603** & 4.001*** & 3.559** & 3.775***\\
				 & (1.500) & (0.945) & (1.497) & (0.979) & (1.392) & (0.964)\\
				Trade Openness & 0.018* & 0.012** & 0.018* & 0.012** & 0.021** & 0.014**\\
				 & (0.009) & (0.006) & (0.010) & (0.006) & (0.009) & (0.006)\\
				BIT & 0.570 & 0.680*** & 0.543 & 0.600*** & 0.786** & 0.848***\\
				 & (0.359) & (0.184) & (0.371) & (0.203) & (0.368) & (0.230)\\
				Financial Openness & 0.234* & 0.288*** & 0.233 & 0.276*** & 0.241* & 0.289***\\
				 & (0.136) & (0.088) & (0.142) & (0.089) & (0.135) & (0.082)\\
				Resource Rents & -0.603*** & -0.721*** & -0.598*** & -0.717*** & -0.602*** & -0.732***\\
				 & (0.214) & (0.186) & (0.228) & (0.198) & (0.217) & (0.177)\\
				Intrastate War & -0.374 & -0.251 & -0.327 & -0.100 & -0.574 & -0.568*\\
				 & (0.283) & (0.252) & (0.281) & (0.319) & (0.359) & (0.327)\\
				Domestic Instability & 0.007 & 0.022 & 0.007 & 0.020 & 0.004 & 0.020\\
				 & (0.028) & (0.027) & (0.028) & (0.028) & (0.030) & (0.027)\\
				Constant & -60.752*** & -51.105*** & -64.098*** & -54.882*** & -57.693*** & -48.444***\\
				 & (11.359) & (6.999) & (11.707) & (8.582) & (11.351) & (7.380)\\
				Observations & 515 & 515 & 489 & 489 & 539 & 539\\
				Number of Countries & 28 & 28 & 28 & 28 & 28 & 28\\
\hline\hline\\

\multicolumn{7} {l}
{\parbox[h][.17in][c]{5.6in} {\scriptsize{\textbf{Note}: All columns include country-specific fixed effects. (not reported). $^{*}$ p$<$0.10; $^{**}$ p$<$0.05; $^{***}$ p$<$0.01. (two-tailed tests)}}}
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\end{table}

\fi






\begin{table}[H]
\begin{center}
     \caption{Effect of Political Cycle in \emph{\textbf{Nascent}} (Semi-)Presidential Democracies (Split Sample)} 
     \scriptsize
     \begin{tabular}{lcccccc}
     \hline\hline
\\		
 \hspace{0.1cm} 				 & (1) & (2) & (3) & (4) & (5) & (6) \\
\\
				Mature Democracy:& \multicolumn{2}{c}{Regime Age$\leq$5}  & \multicolumn{2}{c}{Regime Age$\leq$6} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{Regime Age$\leq$4} \\
\\				
				Estimator: & PCSE & Driscoll-Kraay & PCSE & Driscoll-Kraay & PCSE & Driscoll-Kraay \\

\hline\\

				Election Proximity & 0.308 & 0.341 & 0.458 & 0.461** & 0.511* & 0.529\\
				 & (0.308) & (0.249) & (0.283) & (0.212) & (0.282) & (0.324)\\
				Election Proximity$^2$ & -0.196** & -0.205*** & -0.224** & -0.225*** & -0.252*** & -0.257***\\
				 & (0.097) & (0.068) & (0.091) & (0.072) & (0.095) & (0.088)\\
				\\
				Economic Development & 1.686 & 1.718 & 1.796 & 1.802 & 1.422 & 1.457\\
				 & (1.637) & (1.188) & (1.480) & (1.104) & (2.012) & (1.770)\\
				Economic Growth & 0.005 & 0.002 & 0.009 & 0.008 & 0.006 & 0.005\\
				 & (0.029) & (0.016) & (0.027) & (0.016) & (0.031) & (0.029)\\
				Market Size & 5.305*** & 5.207*** & 5.141*** & 5.142*** & 6.239*** & 6.207***\\
				 & (0.996) & (1.294) & (0.884) & (1.075) & (0.951) & (1.348)\\
				Trade Openness & 0.024 & 0.025* & 0.018 & 0.018 & 0.028 & 0.027**\\
				 & (0.022) & (0.012) & (0.017) & (0.012) & (0.025) & (0.013)\\
				BIT & 2.244*** & 2.204*** & 2.108*** & 2.100*** & 1.675** & 1.603***\\
				 & (0.609) & (0.547) & (0.532) & (0.490) & (0.687) & (0.453)\\
				Financial Openness & 0.070 & 0.090 & 0.083 & 0.084 & -0.028 & -0.018\\
				 & (0.157) & (0.225) & (0.136) & (0.191) & (0.177) & (0.150)\\
				Resource Rents & 0.241 & 0.205 & 0.192 & 0.189 & 0.276 & 0.240\\
				 & (0.402) & (0.278) & (0.309) & (0.201) & (0.308) & (0.266)\\
				Intrastate War & -0.318 & -0.231 & -0.498 & -0.478 & 0.918* & 0.929\\
				 & (0.629) & (1.037) & (0.568) & (0.960) & (0.513) & (0.613)\\
				Domestic Instability & 0.018 & 0.022 & 0.011 & 0.011 & 0.028 & 0.030\\
				 & (0.045) & (0.041) & (0.041) & (0.038) & (0.046) & (0.047)\\
				Constant &  & -61.896*** &  & -61.391*** &  & -69.243***\\
				 &  & (18.391) &  & (15.805) &  & (22.354)\\
				Observations & 228 & 228 & 270 & 270 & 188 & 188\\
				Number of Countries & 43 & 43 & 49 & 49 & 42 & 42\\
\hline\hline\\

\multicolumn{7} {l}
{\parbox[h][.17in][c]{5.6in} {\scriptsize{\textbf{Note}: All columns include country-specific fixed effects. (not reported). $^{*}$ p$<$0.10; $^{**}$ p$<$0.05; $^{***}$ p$<$0.01. (two-tailed tests)}}}
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\end{table}





\iffalse

\begin{table}[H]
\begin{center}
     \caption{Effect of Political Cycle in Nascent \textbf{Presidential} Democracies (Split Sample)} 
     \scriptsize
     \begin{tabular}{lcccccc}
     \hline\hline
\\		
 \hspace{0.1cm} 				 & (1) & (2) & (3) & (4) & (5) & (6) \\
\\
				Mature Democracy:& \multicolumn{2}{c}{Regime Age$>$5}  & \multicolumn{2}{c}{Regime Age$>$6} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{Regime Age$>$4} \\
\\				
				Estimator: & PCSE & Driscoll-Kraay & PCSE & Driscoll-Kraay & PCSE & Driscoll-Kraay \\

\hline\\

				Election Proximity & -0.130 & -0.050 & -0.049 & -0.046 & 0.488 & 0.515\\
				 & (0.482) & (0.476) & (0.433) & (0.368) & (0.447) & (0.603)\\
				Election Proximity^2 & 0.079 & 0.061 & 0.072 & 0.071 & -0.128 & -0.129\\
				 & (0.185) & (0.174) & (0.157) & (0.139) & (0.173) & (0.222)\\
				\\
				Economic Development & 1.150 & 1.240 & 1.449 & 1.455 & 1.038 & 1.128\\
				 & (2.062) & (1.372) & (1.762) & (1.178) & (2.554) & (2.083)\\
				Economic Growth & 0.009 & 0.006 & 0.005 & 0.004 & 0.012 & 0.011\\
				 & (0.035) & (0.026) & (0.033) & (0.024) & (0.040) & (0.034)\\
				Market Size & 4.144*** & 4.031*** & 4.118*** & 4.121*** & 5.055*** & 5.015***\\
				 & (1.180) & (1.047) & (0.976) & (0.872) & (1.153) & (1.255)\\
				Trade Openness & -0.011 & -0.009 & -0.008 & -0.008 & -0.004 & -0.004\\
				 & (0.028) & (0.017) & (0.022) & (0.013) & (0.033) & (0.022)\\
				BIT & 2.223*** & 2.185*** & 2.272*** & 2.270*** & 1.570* & 1.454**\\
				 & (0.798) & (0.577) & (0.773) & (0.602) & (0.954) & (0.601)\\
				Financial Openness & 0.375** & 0.378 & 0.312** & 0.311 & 0.216 & 0.205\\
				 & (0.179) & (0.251) & (0.159) & (0.196) & (0.192) & (0.189)\\
				Resource Rents & 0.291 & 0.228 & 0.217 & 0.215 & 0.228 & 0.137\\
				 & (0.544) & (0.383) & (0.407) & (0.255) & (0.464) & (0.384)\\
				Intrastate War & -1.112* & -1.014 & -1.118* & -1.109 & 0.211 & 0.234\\
				 & (0.668) & (1.104) & (0.590) & (0.945) & (0.558) & (0.544)\\
				Domestic Instability & 0.041 & 0.040 & 0.027 & 0.027 & 0.044 & 0.041\\
				 & (0.065) & (0.067) & (0.070) & (0.065) & (0.073) & (0.070)\\
				Constant &  & -46.226** &  & -48.650*** & -61.367* & -54.658**\\
				 &  & (18.568) &  & (14.646) & (34.227) & (26.771)\\
				Observations & 141 & 141 & 167 & 167 & 117 & 117\\
				Number of Countries & 24 & 24 & 25 & 25 & 24 & 24\\
\hline\hline\\

\multicolumn{7} {l}
{\parbox[h][.17in][c]{5.6in} {\scriptsize{\textbf{Note}: All columns include country-specific fixed effects. (not reported). $^{*}$ p$<$0.10; $^{**}$ p$<$0.05; $^{***}$ p$<$0.01. (two-tailed tests)}}}
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\end{table}

\fi








\begin{table}[H]
\begin{center}
     \caption{Effect of Political Cycle and Age of Democracy in (Semi-)Presidential Democracies (including the interaction between \emph{Election Proximity} and \emph{Mature Democracy})} 
     \scriptsize
     \begin{tabular}{lcccccc}
     \hline\hline
\\		
 \hspace{0.1cm} 				 & (1) & (2) & (3) & (4) & (5) & (6) \\
\\
				Mature Democracy:& \multicolumn{2}{c}{Regime Age$>$5}  & \multicolumn{2}{c}{Regime Age$>$6} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{Regime Age$>$4} \\
\\				
				Estimator: & PCSE & Driscoll-Kraay & PCSE & Driscoll-Kraay & PCSE & Driscoll-Kraay \\

\hline\\

				Election Proximity & 1.247*** & 1.410*** & 0.959** & 1.111*** & 1.205*** & 1.675***\\
				 & (0.375) & (0.442) & (0.386) & (0.370) & (0.444) & (0.446)\\
				\\
				Election Proximity$^2$ & -0.605*** & -0.691*** & -0.471*** & -0.575*** & -0.523*** & -0.741***\\
				 & (0.151) & (0.203) & (0.167) & (0.168) & (0.179) & (0.193)\\
				\\
				Mature Democracy & 0.886*** & 0.787* & 0.535* & 0.588 & 0.398 & 0.663*\\
				 & (0.310) & (0.389) & (0.285) & (0.395) & (0.338) & (0.369)\\
				\\
				Election Proximity $\times$  & -1.487** & -1.447*** & -0.846 & -0.814** & -0.730 & -1.285**\\
				Mature Democracy & (0.585) & (0.383) & (0.547) & (0.391) & (0.620) & (0.489)\\
				\\
				Election Proximity$^2$ $\times$  & 0.779** & 0.720*** & 0.398 & 0.391* & 0.192 & 0.468*\\
				Mature Democracy & (0.330) & (0.185) & (0.310) & (0.209) & (0.325) & (0.248)\\
				\\
				Economic Development & 1.956*** & 1.691*** & 1.853*** & 1.615*** & 1.863*** & 1.640***\\
				 & (0.516) & (0.435) & (0.508) & (0.447) & (0.512) & (0.442)\\
				Economic Growth & 0.004 & 0.020 & 0.002 & 0.020 & 0.004 & 0.020\\
				 & (0.017) & (0.018) & (0.018) & (0.018) & (0.017) & (0.018)\\
				Market Size & 3.771*** & 3.818*** & 3.998*** & 3.877*** & 4.215*** & 3.996***\\
				 & (0.732) & (0.633) & (0.742) & (0.633) & (0.741) & (0.596)\\
				Trade Openness & 0.007 & -0.002 & 0.008 & -0.001 & 0.008 & -0.001\\
				 & (0.009) & (0.012) & (0.009) & (0.012) & (0.009) & (0.012)\\
				BIT & 0.557* & 0.742*** & 0.583** & 0.755*** & 0.569** & 0.749***\\
				 & (0.287) & (0.214) & (0.286) & (0.212) & (0.285) & (0.224)\\
				Financial Openness & 0.237** & 0.286*** & 0.240** & 0.283*** & 0.247*** & 0.288***\\
				 & (0.093) & (0.090) & (0.093) & (0.091) & (0.093) & (0.091)\\
				Resource Rents & -0.330 & -0.302*** & -0.311 & -0.281*** & -0.298 & -0.275***\\
				 & (0.208) & (0.110) & (0.206) & (0.103) & (0.207) & (0.101)\\
				Intrastate War & -0.089 & -0.312 & -0.056 & -0.265 & -0.097 & -0.355\\
				 & (0.290) & (0.300) & (0.287) & (0.302) & (0.286) & (0.323)\\
				Domestic Instability & -0.003 & -0.017 & -0.006 & -0.018 & -0.009 & -0.022\\
				 & (0.021) & (0.016) & (0.021) & (0.016) & (0.021) & (0.016)\\
				Constant & -56.454*** & -45.180*** & -58.064*** & -44.963*** & -60.859*** & -46.410***\\
				 & (8.616) & (7.283) & (8.816) & (7.280) & (8.696) & (6.934)\\
				Observations & 1,081 & 1,081 & 1,081 & 1,081 & 1,081 & 1,081\\
				Number of Countries & 59 & 59 & 59 & 59 & 59 & 59\\
				\hline
				\\
				Linear Combination Tests &&&&&& \\ 
				\\
			  Election Proximity$^2$ & 0.174   & 0.029   & -0.073  & -0.185 & -0.331   & -0.273 \\
				for Mature Democracy & (0.290) & (0.155) & (0.279) & (0.217) & (0.271) & (0.201) \\
\hline\hline\\

\multicolumn{7} {l}
{\parbox[h][.17in][c]{5.6in} {\scriptsize{\textbf{Note}: All columns include country-specific fixed effects. (not reported). $^{*}$ p$<$0.10; $^{**}$ p$<$0.05; $^{***}$ p$<$0.01. (two-tailed tests)}}}
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\end{table}




\iffalse

\begin{table}[H]
\begin{center}
     \caption{Effect of Political Cycle and Age of Democracy on FDI in \textbf{Presidential} Democracies (including the interaction between \emph{Election Proximity} and \emph{Regime Age})} 
     \scriptsize
     \begin{tabular}{lcccccc}
     \hline\hline
\\		
 \hspace{0.1cm} 				 & (1) & (2) & (3) & (4) & (5) & (6) \\
\\
				Mature Democracy:& \multicolumn{2}{c}{Regime Age$>$5}  & \multicolumn{2}{c}{Regime Age$>$6} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{Regime Age$>$4} \\
\\				
				Estimator: & PCSE & Driscoll-Kraay & PCSE & Driscoll-Kraay & PCSE & Driscoll-Kraay \\

\hline\\

				Election Proximity & 1.700*** & 1.746** & 1.260** & 1.387** & 1.665** & 2.299***\\
				 & (0.603) & (0.728) & (0.643) & (0.608) & (0.759) & (0.732)\\
				\\
				Election Proximity^2 & -0.751*** & -0.836** & -0.549* & -0.691** & -0.637** & -0.966***\\
				 & (0.255) & (0.318) & (0.292) & (0.278) & (0.321) & (0.317)\\
				\\
				Mature Democracy & 0.802** & 0.391 & 0.311 & 0.115 & 0.313 & 0.413\\
				 & (0.394) & (0.416) & (0.360) & (0.431) & (0.453) & (0.433)\\
				\\
				Election Proximity \times  & -1.981** & -1.751** & -1.143 & -0.869 & -1.084 & -1.677**\\
				Mature Democracy & (0.795) & (0.679) & (0.803) & (0.746) & (0.878) & (0.733)\\
				\\
				Election Proximity^2 \times & 1.002** & 0.942*** & 0.497 & 0.429 & 0.240 & 0.585*\\
				Mature Democracy & (0.438) & (0.294) & (0.428) & (0.393) & (0.434) & (0.344)\\
				\\
				Economic Development & 2.453*** & 2.075*** & 2.436*** & 2.089*** & 2.469*** & 2.130***\\
				 & (0.739) & (0.472) & (0.730) & (0.455) & (0.731) & (0.457)\\
				Economic Growth & -0.014 & -0.008 & -0.016 & -0.009 & -0.013 & -0.008\\
				 & (0.023) & (0.017) & (0.023) & (0.017) & (0.022) & (0.017)\\
				Market Size & 3.225*** & 3.566*** & 3.564*** & 3.674*** & 3.707*** & 3.658***\\
				 & (0.945) & (0.734) & (0.956) & (0.726) & (0.955) & (0.723)\\
				Trade Openness & 0.016* & 0.011 & 0.016* & 0.010 & 0.016* & 0.011*\\
				 & (0.009) & (0.007) & (0.009) & (0.007) & (0.009) & (0.006)\\
				BIT & 0.764** & 0.882*** & 0.789** & 0.891*** & 0.769** & 0.892***\\
				 & (0.322) & (0.229) & (0.318) & (0.233) & (0.315) & (0.231)\\
				Financial Openness & 0.208* & 0.234*** & 0.212* & 0.236*** & 0.219* & 0.241***\\
				 & (0.115) & (0.065) & (0.114) & (0.063) & (0.114) & (0.065)\\
				Resource Rents & -0.367** & -0.471*** & -0.377** & -0.477*** & -0.404** & -0.489***\\
				 & (0.184) & (0.146) & (0.187) & (0.136) & (0.182) & (0.129)\\
				Intrastate War & -0.419 & -0.623** & -0.436 & -0.631** & -0.422 & -0.660**\\
				 & (0.289) & (0.281) & (0.284) & (0.278) & (0.282) & (0.298)\\
				Domestic Instability & 0.007 & 0.011 & 0.004 & 0.011 & 0.002 & 0.009\\
				 & (0.028) & (0.024) & (0.028) & (0.025) & (0.028) & (0.025)\\
				Constant & -54.711*** & -46.681*** & -58.258*** & -47.555*** & -60.255*** & -48.009***\\
				 & (9.106) & (5.895) & (9.418) & (5.823) & (9.210) & (5.523)\\
				Observations & 656 & 656 & 656 & 656 & 656 & 656\\
				Number of Countries & 30 & 30 & 30 & 30 & 30 & 30\\
\hline\hline\\

\multicolumn{7} {l}
{\parbox[h][.17in][c]{5.6in} {\scriptsize{\textbf{Note}: All columns include country-specific fixed effects. (not reported). $^{*}$ p$<$0.10; $^{**}$ p$<$0.05; $^{***}$ p$<$0.01. (two-tailed tests)}}}
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\end{table}

\fi





\section{Disaggregating autocratic regimes}
Personalist or military dictators, who tend to be more myopic and predatory than those in single-party regimes, would not be able to generate much confidence in stable investment climates even when they have stayed in office for a long time. While this point does not necessarily counteract the overall autocratic investment cycle proposed in this article, we can draw testable expectations from this conjecture: (1) FDI inflows should be greater in party regimes than in military/personalist regimes in general, and (2) if any, the inverted U-shaped investment cycle should be less obvious in military/personalist regimes than in party regimes. The latter expectation is also plausible because periodical leadership transition is more often in party-regimes.

To see a more nuanced investment cycle depending on autocratic regime type, we ran our models by splitting the autocracy sample into military/personalist and party regimes.\footnote{We use the autocratic regime data by \citet{GWF14} for regime classification.} While Table 9 shows that in both autocracy samples the proposed FDI cycle remains statistically significant, coefficient estimates alone do not tell much about how the investment cycle may be different between military/personalist and party regimes. Thus, we ran post-estimation simulations and present two graphs in Figure 1. Interestingly enough, those two theoretical expectations appear to have empirical evidence. First, the amount of FDI inflows is greater in party regimes. Second, the inverted U-shaped FDI cycle is less straightforward in military/personalist regimes. Even though our theoretical prediction holds regardless of autocratic regime type, this nuanced finding indicates that autocratic investment cycle might have significant variations depending on institutional features.      


\begin{table}[H]
\begin{center}
     \caption{Effect of Political Cycle on FDI across Different Autocratic Regime Types} 
     \scriptsize
     \begin{tabular}{lcccc}
     \hline\hline
 \hspace{0.1cm} 				 & (1) & (2) & (3) & (4) \\
				 Sample: & \multicolumn{2}{c}{Military/Personalist}  & \multicolumn{2}{c}{Single-Party} \\
				Estimator: & PCSE & Driscoll-Kraay & PCSE & Driscoll-Kraay \\

\hline\\

				Tenure & 0.467** & 0.463** & 0.780** & 1.006**\\
				 & (0.228) & (0.190) & (0.316) & (0.397)\\
				Tenure$^2$ & -0.188** & -0.181*** & -0.281*** & -0.355***\\
				 & (0.088) & (0.059) & (0.095) & (0.104)\\
				Economic Development & 1.425*** & 1.219** & 0.876** & 0.636**\\
				 & (0.552) & (0.607) & (0.436) & (0.306)\\
				Economic Growth & 0.036*** & 0.046*** & 0.013 & 0.028*\\
				 & (0.008) & (0.007) & (0.010) & (0.015)\\
				Market Size & 3.317*** & 3.071*** & 1.476*** & 1.370***\\
				 & (0.616) & (0.700) & (0.522) & (0.376)\\
				Trade Openness & 0.002 & 0.003 & 0.005 & 0.006\\
				 & (0.004) & (0.004) & (0.003) & (0.004)\\
				BIT & 0.331 & 0.520* & 0.985*** & 1.587***\\
				 & (0.354) & (0.299) & (0.249) & (0.211)\\
				Financial Openness & 0.219** & 0.254*** & 0.413*** & 0.356***\\
				 & (0.105) & (0.061) & (0.110) & (0.066)\\
				Resource Rents & 0.074 & 0.157 & 0.277** & 0.321***\\
				 & (0.148) & (0.151) & (0.121) & (0.090)\\
				Intrastate War & -0.269 & -0.330 & -0.057 & -0.188\\
				 & (0.219) & (0.247) & (0.478) & (0.420)\\
				Domestic Instability & 0.011 & 0.008 & -0.039* & -0.062*\\
				 & (0.020) & (0.017) & (0.021) & (0.032)\\
				Constant &  & -34.968*** &  & -16.107***\\
				 &  & (6.964) &  & (3.854)\\
				\\
				Observations & 913 & 913 & 930 & 930\\
				Number of Countries & 61 & 61 & 48 & 48\\
\hline\hline\\

\multicolumn{5} {l}
{\parbox[h][.17in][c]{3.8in} {\scriptsize{\textbf{Note}:All columns include country-specific fixed effects. (not reported). $^{*}$ p$<$0.10; $^{**}$ p$<$0.05; $^{***}$ p$<$0.01. (two-tailed tests)}}}
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\end{table}



\begin{figure}[H]
\begin{center}
\caption{Effect of Political Cycle on FDI across Different Autocratic Regime Types} 
{\includegraphics[width=5.8in,height=4in,trim= 0 0 0 0]{autoregime.pdf}}
\end{center}
\vspace{-.25in}
\end{figure}


\section{Lagged dependent variable}
We performed robustness checks using an OLS with country fixed-effects and a lagged dependent variable on the right hand side of the equation. The results in Table 10 show that the coefficient estimates for $\textsc{tenure}^2$, $\textsc{election proximity}^2$ and $\textsc{election quantile}^2$ are negative and significant, which is consistent with our hypotheses. Thus we believe that our main findings are not driven by a particular estimator choice. 

\begin{table}[H]
\begin{center}
     \caption{Effect of Political Cycle (using a fixed-effects OLS with a lagged dependent variable)} 
     \scriptsize
     \begin{tabular}{lccccc}
     \hline\hline
\\		
 \hspace{0.1cm} 				 & (1) & (2) & (3) & (4) & (5) \\
\\
				Sample: & Autocracy & (Semi-)Presidential & Presidential & (Semi-)Presidential & Presidential  \\

\hline\\

				FDI Inflows (t-1) & 0.398*** & 0.320*** & 0.179*** & 0.272*** & 0.285***\\
				 & (0.021) & (0.030) & (0.040) & (0.032) & (0.041)\\
				Tenure & 0.366** &  &  &  & \\
				 & (0.170) &  &  &  & \\
				Tenure$^2$ & -0.135*** &  &  &  & \\
				 & (0.050) &  &  &  & \\
				Election Proximity &  & 0.467** & 0.808*** &  & \\
				 &  & (0.189) & (0.242) &  & \\
				Election Proximity$^2$ &  & -0.298*** & -0.458*** &  & \\
				 &  & (0.077) & (0.098) &  & \\
				Election Quantile &  &  &  & 0.829* & 1.196*\\
				 &  &  &  & (0.494) & (0.707)\\
				Election Quantile$^2$ &  &  &  & -1.002** & -1.372**\\
				 &  &  &  & (0.472) & (0.677)\\
				Economic Development & 0.562** & 1.168*** & 1.786*** & 1.824*** & 1.602***\\
				 & (0.219) & (0.445) & (0.596) & (0.397) & (0.582)\\
				Economic Growth & 0.026*** & 0.013 & -0.008 & 0.006 & -0.008\\
				 & (0.005) & (0.015) & (0.019) & (0.013) & (0.019)\\
				Market Size & 1.187*** & 2.987*** & 3.009*** & 2.692*** & 2.720***\\
				 & (0.220) & (0.507) & (0.625) & (0.459) & (0.623)\\
				Trade Openness & 0.001 & -0.000 & 0.008 & 0.013** & 0.007\\
				 & (0.002) & (0.006) & (0.008) & (0.006) & (0.008)\\
				BIT & 0.734*** & 0.430* & 0.705** & 0.657*** & 0.679**\\
				 & (0.162) & (0.230) & (0.288) & (0.204) & (0.283)\\
				Financial Openness & 0.210*** & 0.189** & 0.188** & 0.136** & 0.166*\\
				 & (0.061) & (0.074) & (0.088) & (0.066) & (0.087)\\
				Resource Rents & 0.149** & -0.204* & -0.391*** & -0.213** & -0.327**\\
				 & (0.069) & (0.106) & (0.151) & (0.093) & (0.148)\\
				Intrastate War & -0.409** & -0.175 & -0.461 & -0.276 & -0.349\\
				 & (0.186) & (0.369) & (0.393) & (0.326) & (0.381)\\
				Domestic Instability & -0.028* & -0.023 & 0.006 & -0.011 & 0.000\\
				 & (0.015) & (0.021) & (0.028) & (0.019) & (0.028)\\
				Constant & -13.879*** & -33.984*** & -39.397*** & -37.525*** & -35.728***\\
				 & (2.554) & (5.847) & (6.864) & (5.269) & (6.803)\\
				Observations & 2,021 & 1,079 & 655 & 1,016 & 630\\
				Number of Countries & 96 & 59 & 30 & 56 & 29\\
				\hline\hline\\

\multicolumn{6} {l}
{\parbox[h][.17in][c]{5.4in} {\scriptsize{\textbf{Note}: All columns include country-specific fixed effects. (not reported). $^{*}$ p$<$0.10; $^{**}$ p$<$0.05; $^{***}$ p$<$0.01. (two-tailed tests)}}}
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\end{table}




\section{Contemporaneous shocks}
We checked the robustness of our results including year dummies: (1) using the Driscoll-Krray estimator with country-specific fixed effects and year dummies, and (2) using a fixed-effects OLS with a lagged dependent variable and year dummies.\footnote{PCSE models fail to converge including year dummies.} Table 11 reports the results from the Driscoll-Krray models, and Table 12 presents results from OLS with country fixed effects and a lagged dependent variable. We find that our main findings largely hold against contemporaneous shocks.        

\begin{table}[H]
\begin{center}
     \caption{Effect of Political Cycle (using the Driscoll-Krray estimator and including year dummies)} 
     \scriptsize
     \begin{tabular}{lccccc}
     \hline\hline
\\		
 \hspace{0.1cm} 				 & (1) & (2) & (3) & (4) & (5) \\
\\
				Sample: & Autocracy & (Semi-)Presidential & Presidential & (Semi-)Presidential & Presidential  \\

\hline\\

				Tenure & 0.616*** &  &  &  & \\
				 & (0.204) &  &  &  & \\
				Tenure$^2$ & -0.206*** &  &  &  & \\
				 & (0.059) &  &  &  & \\
				Election Proximity &  & 0.839*** & 1.030** &  & \\
				 &  & (0.272) & (0.409) &  & \\
				Election Proximity$^2$ &  & -0.485*** & -0.573** &  & \\
				 &  & (0.158) & (0.237) &  & \\
				Election Quantile &  &  &  & 0.875 & 0.900\\
				 &  &  &  & (0.562) & (0.708)\\
				Election Quantile$^2$ &  &  &  & -1.039** & -1.082\\
				 &  &  &  & (0.512) & (0.697)\\
				Economic Development & 0.963** & -1.255 & 0.099 & -0.044 & -0.375\\
				 & (0.376) & (0.908) & (0.824) & (0.643) & (0.820)\\
				Economic Growth & 0.028*** & 0.017 & -0.011 & 0.006 & -0.017\\
				 & (0.006) & (0.018) & (0.017) & (0.016) & (0.018)\\
				Market Size & -0.449 & -1.391 & -1.008 & -0.674 & -1.838**\\
				 & (0.735) & (1.195) & (1.062) & (0.710) & (0.864)\\
				Trade Openness & 0.002 & -0.008 & 0.008 & 0.011** & 0.008\\
				 & (0.002) & (0.014) & (0.006) & (0.005) & (0.006)\\
				BIT & 1.012*** & 0.260 & 0.641** & 0.581*** & 0.704***\\
				 & (0.170) & (0.333) & (0.253) & (0.183) & (0.222)\\
				Financial Openness & 0.307*** & 0.213* & 0.275*** & 0.105 & 0.213**\\
				 & (0.074) & (0.107) & (0.084) & (0.081) & (0.087)\\
				Resource Rents & 0.254** & -0.283** & -0.592*** & -0.303*** & -0.589***\\
				 & (0.116) & (0.138) & (0.152) & (0.092) & (0.150)\\
				Intrastate War & -0.547*** & -0.404 & -0.500** & -0.352 & -0.387*\\
				 & (0.183) & (0.259) & (0.204) & (0.214) & (0.200)\\
				Domestic Instability & -0.039*** & -0.019 & 0.016 & -0.018 & 0.006\\
				 & (0.011) & (0.014) & (0.027) & (0.018) & (0.029)\\
				Constant & 0.000 & 0.000 & 0.000 & 0.000 & 25.066*\\
				 & (0.000) & (0.000) & (0.000) & (0.000) & (12.751)\\
				Observations & 2,050 & 1,081 & 656 & 1,018 & 631\\
				Number of Countries & 96 & 59 & 30 & 56 & 29\\
				\hline\hline\\

\multicolumn{6} {l}
{\parbox[h][.17in][c]{5.4in} {\scriptsize{\textbf{Note}: All columns include country-specific fixed effects and year dummies. (not reported). $^{*}$ p$<$0.10; $^{**}$ p$<$0.05; $^{***}$ p$<$0.01. (two-tailed tests)}}}
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\end{table}






\begin{table}[H]
\begin{center}
     \caption{Effect of Political Cycle (using the fixed-effects OLS and including year dummies)} 
     \scriptsize
     \begin{tabular}{lccccc}
     \hline\hline
\\		
 \hspace{0.1cm} 				 & (1) & (2) & (3) & (4) & (5) \\
\\
				Sample: & Autocracy & (Semi-)Presidential & Presidential & (Semi-)Presidential & Presidential  \\

\hline\\

				FDI Inflows (t-1) & 0.380*** & 0.288*** & 0.159*** & 0.254*** & 0.259***\\
				 & (0.022) & (0.031) & (0.041) & (0.033) & (0.043)\\
				Tenure & 0.390** &  &  &  & \\
				 & (0.169) &  &  &  & \\
				Tenure$^2$ & -0.133*** &  &  &  & \\
				 & (0.049) &  &  &  & \\
				Election Proximity &  & 0.531*** & 0.839*** &  & \\
				 &  & (0.191) & (0.251) &  & \\
				Election Proximity$^2$ &  & -0.316*** & -0.469*** &  & \\
				 &  & (0.078) & (0.101) &  & \\
				Election Quantile &  &  &  & 0.791 & 0.820\\
				 &  &  &  & (0.503) & (0.735)\\
				Election Quantile$^2$ &  &  &  & -0.949** & -0.994\\
				 &  &  &  & (0.479) & (0.703)\\
				Economic Development & 0.474** & -0.901 & 0.060 & 0.143 & -0.202\\
				 & (0.219) & (0.593) & (0.773) & (0.557) & (0.761)\\
				Economic Growth & 0.023*** & 0.008 & -0.011 & 0.001 & -0.015\\
				 & (0.005) & (0.016) & (0.021) & (0.014) & (0.021)\\
				Market Size & -0.143 & -0.926 & -1.034 & -0.285 & -1.545\\
				 & (0.701) & (0.942) & (1.473) & (0.855) & (1.453)\\
				Trade Openness & 0.000 & -0.006 & 0.007 & 0.008 & 0.007\\
				 & (0.002) & (0.006) & (0.009) & (0.006) & (0.008)\\
				BIT & 0.632*** & 0.131 & 0.516* & 0.364 & 0.482\\
				 & (0.165) & (0.249) & (0.304) & (0.223) & (0.299)\\
				Financial Openness & 0.189*** & 0.152* & 0.229** & 0.096 & 0.172*\\
				 & (0.062) & (0.080) & (0.095) & (0.072) & (0.095)\\
				Resource Rents & 0.181** & -0.232** & -0.508*** & -0.238** & -0.445***\\
				 & (0.071) & (0.115) & (0.170) & (0.102) & (0.168)\\
				Intrastate War & -0.339* & -0.266 & -0.417 & -0.279 & -0.279\\
				 & (0.187) & (0.371) & (0.399) & (0.330) & (0.388)\\
				Domestic Instability & -0.029* & -0.017 & 0.011 & -0.012 & 0.004\\
				 & (0.015) & (0.022) & (0.030) & (0.020) & (0.029)\\
				Constant & 0.248 & 23.264* & 16.422 & 7.055 & 23.205\\
				 & (7.032) & (12.674) & (18.650) & (11.799) & (18.428)\\
				Observations & 2,021 & 1,079 & 655 & 1,016 & 630\\
				Number of Countries & 96 & 59 & 30 & 56 & 29\\
				\hline\hline\\

\multicolumn{6} {l}
{\parbox[h][.17in][c]{5.4in} {\scriptsize{\textbf{Note}: All columns include country-specific fixed effects and year dummies. (not reported). $^{*}$ p$<$0.10; $^{**}$ p$<$0.05; $^{***}$ p$<$0.01. (two-tailed tests)}}}
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\end{table}



\section{Using predicted probability of autocratic leadership failure}
We acknowledge that autocratic leadership tenure does not fully capture a latent concept of leadership vulnerability or risk of leadership failure, while tenure is easily observable. Autocratic time horizon (hereafter ATH), that is how long an autocrat expects to stay in office, might be a better measure of autocratic leadership vulnerability. 

First of all, the primary goal of our article is to reveal observable temporal variations in FDI inflows over the course of autocratic leadership cycle. Models using ATH instead of tenure entail somewhat different theoretical arguments because tenure and ATH are two distinct concepts. For example, past studies have found that domestic political instability, that often results in short time horizons, reduces FDI inflows. For example, a recent study by \citet{Moon15}, reveals that autocrats with long time horizons tend to provide strong commitment institutions that help attract more FDI. While these studies indicate that autocratic time horizon has a positive relationship with FDI inflows, this finding does not show whether FDI inflows have a cyclical pattern over the course of autocratic tenure. In addition, ATH is likely to be endogenous to FDI, whereas it is difficult to find a mechanism through which FDI at time \emph{t} determines how long a leader has stayed in office up to time \emph{t}.  

Second, measuring the latent concept of ATH is notoriously difficult. A researcher might use individual proxies of ATH such as the number of past leadership turnovers, the number of past coups or regime durability. However, these proxies cannot capture temporal variations in autocratic leadership stability, and regime duration is not conceptually equivalent to leadership stability. An alternative method, used by \citet{Wright08, Blake13, Moon15}, is to calculate the predicted probability of autocratic leadership failure for a given leader-year. While this method enables a researcher to employ multiple proxies of leadership vulnerability, it suffers from several methodological problems. First, researchers as outside observers may not observe critical information that autocrats use in calculating their time horizons, which makes the ATH measure highly unreliable. Also studies using this estimated ATH measure fail to incorporate uncertainties around the estimates into the regression models. Third, researchers often use \emph{ex post} information to calculate predicted probabilities of leadership failure, which was unavailable to autocrats themselves in office. Given these measurement issues, we are cautious of literally accepting the following empirical results using the estimated ATH measure. 

Table 13 reports the results from the ATH equation that generates predicted probabilities of leadership failure. From this probit regression of leadership failure, we obtain the linear expectations of $\widehat{ATH}$.\footnote{Data sources for variables included in this regression are as follows. Economic development (GDP per capita) and growth are taken from Penn World Tables v.7.0 \citep{HestonSummersAten11}, Leader age and tenure variables from the Archigos database \citep{Archigos}, coup attempts from \citet{PowellThyne11}, oil rents from \citet{Ross12}, domestic political instability (a logged domestic conflict index) from the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (CNTS) \citep{Banks13}, foreign aid from Aid Data \citep{aiddata}, civil war from the UCDP armed conflict data \citep{Gleditsch02}, military regime from \citet{DDR10}, past colonial experience from \citet{HadeniusTeorell05}.} Then, the FDI model in Table 10 estimates the impact of $\widehat{ATH}$ on FDI inflows. 

The results in Table 14 show that $\widehat{ATH}$ has negative effect on FDI inflows (significant only in the Driscoll-Kraay model). In relation to our article, this finding indicates that foreign investors tend to hesitate to make investment when autocrats have short time horizons or when autocratic leadership is vulnerable. This is largely consistent with the findings of the literature.   



\begin{table}[H]
\begin{center}
     \caption{Probit Model of Autocratic Time Horizon} 
     \scriptsize
     \begin{tabular}{lc}
     \hline\hline
		\\

				Economic Development & -0.183\\
				 & (0.158)\\
				Economic Growth & -0.019***\\
				 & (0.004)\\
				Leader Age & 0.028***\\
				 & (0.005)\\
				Oil Rents & -0.023\\
				 & (0.055)\\
				Foreign Aid & -0.030*\\
				 & (0.018)\\
				Colonial Experience & -1.790***\\
				 & (0.692)\\
				Past Coup Attempts & 0.097\\
				 & (0.123)\\
				Civil War & 0.210\\
				 & (0.156)\\
				Domestic Political Instability & 0.027**\\
				 & (0.014)\\
				Military Regime & 0.193\\
				 & (0.129)\\
				Leader Tenure & 0.031\\
				 & (0.038)\\
				Leader Tenure$^2$ & -0.004\\
				 & (0.003)\\
				Leader Tenure$^2$ & 0.000**\\
				 & (0.000)\\
				Constant & -0.564\\
				 & (1.218)\\
				\\
				Observations & 2,265\\
				Number of Countries & 106 \\
				\\
				\hline\hline\\

\multicolumn{2} {l}
{\parbox[h][.62in][c]{2.4in} {\scriptsize{\textbf{Note}: All control variables, except economic growth, leader age, military regime, colonial experience and leader tenures, are lagged by one year. All columns include country-specific fixed effects. (not reported). $^{*}$ p$<$0.10; $^{**}$ p$<$0.05; $^{***}$ p$<$0.01. (two-tailed tests)}}}
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\end{table}




\begin{table}[H]
\begin{center}
     \caption{Effect of Autocratic Time Horizon on FDI} 
     \scriptsize
     \begin{tabular}{lcc}
     \hline\hline
		\\
		Estimator: & PCSE & Driscoll-Kraay  \\
		\\
\hline
		\\

				Autocratic Time Horizon & -0.255 & -0.298***\\
				 & (0.162) & (0.095)\\
				Economic Development & 1.331*** & 1.213***\\
				 & (0.328) & (0.325)\\
				Economic Growth & 0.013** & 0.022***\\
				 & (0.006) & (0.006)\\
				Market Size & 2.166*** & 1.941***\\
				 & (0.396) & (0.452)\\
				Trade Openness & 0.001 & 0.002\\
				 & (0.003) & (0.002)\\
				BIT & 0.888*** & 1.219***\\
				 & (0.217) & (0.206)\\
				Financial Openness & 0.310*** & 0.320***\\
				 & (0.079) & (0.072)\\
				Resource Rents & 0.095 & 0.149\\
				 & (0.109) & (0.095)\\
				Intrastate War & -0.469** & -0.704***\\
				 & (0.219) & (0.179)\\
				Domestic Instability & -0.011 & -0.026*\\
				 & (0.014) & (0.013)\\
				Constant & -32.514*** & -25.197***\\
				 & (4.169) & (2.912)\\
				\\
				Observations & 1,815 & 1,815\\
				Number of Countries & 83 & 83\\
				\\
				\hline\hline\\

\multicolumn{3} {l}
{\parbox[h][.42in][c]{2.7in} {\scriptsize{\textbf{Note}: All columns include country-specific fixed effects. (not reported). $^{*}$ p$<$0.10; $^{**}$ p$<$0.05; $^{***}$ p$<$0.01. (two-tailed tests)}}}
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\end{table}






\section{Effect of election cycle conditioned by economic growth}
It might be the case that the effect of electoral cycle might become smaller when a country is experiencing significant economic growth, because a leader might have less incentives to reverse any economic conditions that have been proven to be successful. We test this conjecture by including interaction terms between election proximity and economic growth, to see if the effect of political cycle is conditioned by economic growth rate. The results in Table 15 show that our main findings hold regardless of these interaction terms, but we could not find evidence for the conjecture. 

\begin{table}[H]
\begin{center}
     \caption{Effect of Political Cycle Conditioned by Economic Growth} 
     \scriptsize
     \begin{tabular}{lcccc}
     \hline\hline
 \hspace{0.1cm} 				 & (1) & (2) & (3) & (4) \\
				  & (Semi) & (Semi) &  &  \\
				 Sample: & Presidential & Presidential & Presidential & Presidential \\
				Estimator: & PCSE & Driscoll-Kraay & PCSE & Driscoll-Kraay \\

\hline\\

			Election Proximity & 0.611** & 0.777*** & 0.619* & 0.868**\\
			 & (0.251) & (0.244) & (0.362) & (0.396)\\
			Election Proximity$^2$ & -0.366*** & -0.480*** & -0.345* & -0.517**\\
			 & (0.134) & (0.138) & (0.204) & (0.220)\\
			Economic Growth & 0.015 & 0.010 & -0.003 & -0.051\\
			 & (0.030) & (0.030) & (0.048) & (0.045)\\
			Election Proximity $\times$ & 0.012 & 0.039 & 0.026 & 0.096\\
			Economic Growth & (0.045) & (0.037) & (0.077) & (0.072)\\
			\\
			Election Proximity$^2$ $\times$ & -0.013 & -0.017 & -0.022 & -0.036\\
			Economic Growth & (0.018) & (0.015) & (0.031) & (0.030)\\
			\\
			Economic Development & 1.748*** & 1.519*** & 2.318*** & 2.040***\\
			 & (0.516) & (0.432) & (0.738) & (0.451)\\
			Market Size & 4.191*** & 4.107*** & 3.521*** & 3.611***\\
			 & (0.735) & (0.524) & (0.933) & (0.679)\\
			Trade Openness & 0.010 & 0.001 & 0.016* & 0.010\\
			 & (0.009) & (0.011) & (0.009) & (0.007)\\
			BIT & 0.560* & 0.728*** & 0.778** & 0.878***\\
			 & (0.292) & (0.246) & (0.318) & (0.233)\\
			Financial Openness & 0.245*** & 0.284*** & 0.216* & 0.237***\\
			 & (0.095) & (0.092) & (0.114) & (0.061)\\
			Resource Rents & -0.296 & -0.259** & -0.367** & -0.458***\\
			 & (0.210) & (0.106) & (0.181) & (0.140)\\
			Intrastate War & -0.033 & -0.268 & -0.328 & -0.486\\
			 & (0.289) & (0.334) & (0.286) & (0.308)\\
			Domestic Instability & -0.008 & -0.027* & 0.003 & 0.010\\
			 & (0.021) & (0.015) & (0.028) & (0.024)\\
			Constant & -59.122*** & -45.976*** & -56.424*** & -46.394***\\
			 & (9.030) & (6.402) & (9.736) & (5.596)\\
			\\
			Observations & 1,081 & 1,081 & 656 & 656\\
			Number of Countries & 59 & 59 & 30 & 30\\
\hline\hline\\

\multicolumn{5} {l}
{\parbox[h][.17in][c]{4.1in} {\scriptsize{\textbf{Note}: All columns include country-specific fixed effects. (not reported). $^{*}$ p$<$0.10; $^{**}$ p$<$0.05; $^{***}$ p$<$0.01. (two-tailed tests)}}}
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\end{table}



\section{Marginal effect plot}

The following marginal-effect plots convey similar information as the graphs in text do, but additionally show how the marginal effect changes over the course of tenure or election cycle along with 95\% confidence intervals. I find that the marginal impact of tenure is highly positive early in autocrats' tenure, but becomes negative at the end of tenure, which is consistent with my theoretical expectation. However, the negative effect appears to remain significant only in the far-right range of tenure. Similarly, the right graph shows that the marginal effect of election proximity is changing from positive to negative over the electoral cycle, which also supports my hypothesis. These results are reported in the appendix.   

\makeatletter
\setlength{\@fptop}{0pt}
\makeatother
\begin{figure}
	\begin{center}
		\caption{Marginal effect of tenure and election proximity}\label{margin}  
		{\includegraphics[width=6.0in,height=4.1in,trim= 0 0 0 0]{margin.pdf}}
	\end{center}
	\vspace{-.25in}
\end{figure} 



\section{Omitted variables and political constraints}
Further we test the robustness of our results including addtional control variables: political constraints on executive power (i.e., veto power) using the Political Constraints Index \citep{Henisz02}, property rights protection using the contract-intensive money indicator \citep{Clague99}, exchange rate using the Penn World Table (v. 8.1) data \citep{HestonSummersAten11}, and economic crisis \citep{Rogoff11}. Economic crisis a dichotomous variable that takes one when a country experiences currency crisis, stock market crash, domestic/external sovereign debt crisis, or banking crisis in a given year using the Reinhart-Rogoff financial crisis database. We also include year dummies to capture common economic shocks from global economic crises, which makes the PCSE models fail to converge.\footnote{Our main findings still hold using the PCSE models without year dummies.} We report the results from the Driscoll-Krray models. Table 16 shows that our main findings hold including these additional control variables. 
 


\begin{table}[H]
\begin{center}
     \caption{Effect of Political Cycle on FDI Inflows (controlling for constraints on the executive power, property rights protection, economic crisis, and exchange rate)}
     \scriptsize
     \begin{tabular}{lccc}
     \hline\hline
 \hspace{0.1cm} 				 & (1) & (2) & (3)  \\
				 Sample:& Autocracy & (Semi-)Presidential & Presidential \\
				Estimator: &  Driscoll-Kraay &  Driscoll-Kraay  & Driscoll-Kraay \\

\hline\\

				Tenure & 0.546*** &  & \\
				& (0.193) &  & \\
				Tenure$^2$ & -0.183*** &  & \\
				& (0.055) &  & \\
				Election Proximity &  & 0.841*** & 1.019***\\
				&  & (0.229) & (0.339)\\
				Election Proximity$^2$ &  & -0.474*** & -0.576***\\
				&  & (0.134) & (0.209)\\
				Economic Development & 1.082*** & 2.471*** & 2.443***\\
				& (0.364) & (0.349) & (0.523)\\
				Economic Growth & 0.032*** & 0.007 & -0.012\\
				& (0.006) & (0.016) & (0.018)\\
				Market Size & 1.426** & 3.484*** & 3.336***\\
				& (0.562) & (0.547) & (0.691)\\
				Trade Openness & 0.003 & 0.017*** & 0.008\\
				& (0.002) & (0.005) & (0.007)\\
				BIT & 1.042*** & 0.831*** & 0.890***\\
				& (0.165) & (0.191) & (0.252)\\
				Financial Openness & 0.363*** & 0.168** & 0.198**\\
				& (0.082) & (0.065) & (0.080)\\
				Resource Rents & 0.178 & -0.250** & -0.470***\\
				& (0.105) & (0.096) & (0.138)\\
				Intrastate War & -0.815*** & -0.114 & -0.349\\
				& (0.244) & (0.361) & (0.360)\\
				Domestic Instability & -0.036*** & -0.008 & 0.015\\
				& (0.012) & (0.015) & (0.026)\\
				Veto Power (Political Constraints) & 2.442*** & 0.710* & 0.357\\
				& (0.395) & (0.399) & (0.804)\\
				Exchange Rate & 0.000 & 0.000 & 0.000\\
				& (0.000) & (0.000) & (0.000)\\
				Contract Intensive Money (Property Rights) & 0.227 & 0.532 & 0.949\\
				& (0.832) & (1.162) & (1.481)\\
				Economic Crisis & -0.002 & -0.004 & -0.036\\
				& (0.231) & (0.181) & (0.246)\\
				Constant & -19.331*** & -50.162*** & -48.181***\\
				& (3.487) & (4.189) & (4.977)\\
				\\
				Observations & 1,790 & 1,002 & 627\\
				Number of groups & 88 & 58 & 29\\
				
\hline\hline\\
				
\multicolumn{4} {l}
{\parbox[h][.17in][c]{5.0in} {\scriptsize{\textbf{Note}: All columns include country-specific fixed effects and year dummies. (not reported). $^{*}$ p$<$0.10; $^{**}$ p$<$0.05; $^{***}$ p$<$0.01. (two-tailed tests)}}}
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\end{table}









\section{Developing vs. developed countries}
 

\begin{table}[H]
\begin{center}
     \caption{Effect of Political Cycle on FDI in \textbf{Developing} Countries} 
     \scriptsize
     \begin{tabular}{lcccccc}
     \hline\hline
\\		
 \hspace{0.1cm} 				 & (1) & (2) & (3) & (4) & (5) & (6) \\
\\
				Sample:& \multicolumn{2}{c}{Autocracy}  & \multicolumn{2}{c}{(Semi-)Presidential Democracy} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{Presidential Democracy} \\
\\				
				Estimator: & PCSE & Driscoll-Kraay & PCSE & Driscoll-Kraay & PCSE & Driscoll-Kraay \\

\hline\\

				Tenure & 0.531*** & 0.619*** &  &  &  & \\
				& (0.187) & (0.205) &  &  &  & \\
				Tenure$^2$ & -0.197*** & -0.221*** &  &  &  & \\
				& (0.061) & (0.056) &  &  &  & \\
				Election Proximity &  &  & 0.686*** & 0.952*** & 0.681* & 1.039***\\
				&  &  & (0.251) & (0.248) & (0.369) & (0.357)\\
				Election Proximity$^2$ &  &  & -0.397*** & -0.537*** & -0.373* & -0.575**\\
				&  &  & (0.137) & (0.143) & (0.212) & (0.212)\\
				Economic Development & 1.317*** & 1.140*** & 2.440*** & 2.261*** & 2.319*** & 2.011***\\
				& (0.321) & (0.299) & (0.529) & (0.352) & (0.754) & (0.483)\\
				Economic Growth & 0.023*** & 0.033*** & -0.009 & 0.001 & -0.017 & -0.010\\
				& (0.005) & (0.006) & (0.018) & (0.015) & (0.024) & (0.018)\\
				Market Size & 2.020*** & 1.767*** & 3.779*** & 3.751*** & 3.560*** & 3.620***\\
				& (0.402) & (0.462) & (0.774) & (0.602) & (0.916) & (0.717)\\
				Trade Openness & 0.002 & 0.003 & 0.022*** & 0.018*** & 0.016* & 0.011*\\
				& (0.003) & (0.002) & (0.007) & (0.006) & (0.009) & (0.006)\\
				BIT & 0.911*** & 1.241*** & 0.681** & 0.762*** & 0.802** & 0.891***\\
				& (0.230) & (0.189) & (0.324) & (0.266) & (0.340) & (0.277)\\
				Financial Openness & 0.309*** & 0.339*** & 0.205** & 0.198*** & 0.214* & 0.235***\\
				& (0.079) & (0.063) & (0.101) & (0.063) & (0.117) & (0.061)\\
				Resource Rents & 0.157 & 0.212* & -0.341** & -0.445*** & -0.418** & -0.509***\\
				& (0.112) & (0.114) & (0.162) & (0.116) & (0.189) & (0.144)\\
				Intrastate War & -0.391* & -0.636*** & -0.059 & -0.295 & -0.361 & -0.546*\\
				& (0.223) & (0.199) & (0.283) & (0.309) & (0.278) & (0.286)\\
				Domestic Instability & -0.017 & -0.039*** & -0.002 & -0.008 & 0.005 & 0.015\\
				& (0.014) & (0.013) & (0.023) & (0.018) & (0.030) & (0.026)\\
				Constant &  & -22.926*** &  & -49.059*** & -58.974*** & -45.822***\\
				&  & (3.109) &  & (4.308) & (10.009) & (5.271)\\
				\\
				Observations & 2,026 & 2,026 & 816 & 816 & 598 & 598\\
				Number of Countries & 92 & 92 & 51 & 51 & 27 & 27\\
\hline\hline\\

\multicolumn{7} {l}
{\parbox[h][.17in][c]{5.6in} {\scriptsize{\textbf{Note}: All columns include country-specific fixed effects. (not reported). $^{*}$ p$<$0.10; $^{**}$ p$<$0.05; $^{***}$ p$<$0.01. (two-tailed tests)}}}
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\end{table}






\begin{table}[H]
\begin{center}
     \caption{Effect of Political Cycle on FDI in \textbf{Developed} Countries} 
     \scriptsize
     \begin{tabular}{lcccccc}
     \hline\hline
\\		
 \hspace{0.1cm} 				 & (1) & (2) & (3) & (4) & (5) & (6) \\
\\
				Sample:& \multicolumn{2}{c}{Autocracy}  & \multicolumn{2}{c}{(Semi-)Presidential Democracy} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{Presidential Democracy} \\
\\				
				Estimator: & PCSE & Driscoll-Kraay & PCSE & Driscoll-Kraay & PCSE & Driscoll-Kraay \\

\hline\\

				Tenure & -0.440 & -0.426 &  &  &  & \\
				& (0.317) & (0.360) &  &  &  & \\
				Tenure$^2$ & 0.174* & 0.171 &  &  &  & \\
				& (0.092) & (0.103) &  &  &  & \\
				Election Proximity &  &  & -0.005 & 0.092 & 0.776 & 1.518\\
				&  &  & (0.569) & (0.435) & (1.092) & (1.555)\\
				Election Proximity$^2$ &  &  & -0.074 & -0.191 & -0.521 & -1.013\\
				&  &  & (0.339) & (0.269) & (0.771) & (1.019)\\
				Economic Development & 1.901*** & 1.874** & 2.611 & 3.800** & 23.663* & 23.074**\\
				& (0.640) & (0.666) & (3.291) & (1.461) & (12.474) & (9.373)\\
				Economic Growth & 0.033** & 0.034 & 0.119* & 0.183** & 0.174 & 0.148\\
				& (0.016) & (0.022) & (0.070) & (0.078) & (0.151) & (0.096)\\
				Market Size & 20.591** & 21.764 & 4.142 & 0.240 & -29.645 & -26.949\\
				& (9.783) & (24.222) & (6.064) & (3.671) & (27.761) & (18.672)\\
				Trade Openness & -0.031 & -0.035 & -0.038 & -0.077* & -0.062 & -0.088\\
				& (0.039) & (0.087) & (0.042) & (0.042) & (0.202) & (0.069)\\
				BIT & -0.635* & -0.671 & 1.098 & 1.998*** & 0.340 & -0.009\\
				& (0.381) & (0.782) & (0.702) & (0.639) & (1.011) & (0.660)\\
				Financial Openness & 0.550*** & 0.526*** & 0.490* & 0.709** & -0.044 & 0.421\\
				& (0.140) & (0.129) & (0.292) & (0.272) & (0.641) & (0.729)\\
				Resource Rents & 0.265*** & 0.247 & -0.128 & 0.270 & 0.749 & 0.507\\
				& (0.088) & (0.165) & (0.475) & (0.204) & (0.469) & (0.341)\\
				Intrastate War &  & 0.000 &  & 0.000 &  & 0.000\\
				&  & (0.000) &  & (0.000) &  & (0.000)\\
				Domestic Instability & 0.058 & 0.065 & 0.000 & 0.010 & 0.038 & -0.002\\
				& (0.061) & (0.081) & (0.049) & (0.039) & (0.113) & (0.085)\\
				Constant &  & -233.747 & -68.615 & -31.342 & 129.997 & 87.246\\
				&  & (242.228) & (53.297) & (34.028) & (229.558) & (123.210)\\
				Observations & 24 & 24 & 265 & 265 & 58 & 58\\
				Number of Countries & 5 & 5 & 11 & 11 & 3 & 3\\\hline\hline\\

\multicolumn{7} {l}
{\parbox[h][.17in][c]{5.6in} {\scriptsize{\textbf{Note}: All columns include country-specific fixed effects. (not reported). $^{*}$ p$<$0.10; $^{**}$ p$<$0.05; $^{***}$ p$<$0.01. (two-tailed tests)}}}
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\end{table}




\section{Impact of major Asian economies under autocracy}
As a robustness check, we reran the autocracy models dropping Taiwan ($\sim$1995), China, South Korea ($\sim$1987), and Singapore. Table 19 shows that the results are little different from those using the full autocracy sample.   


\begin{table}[H]
\begin{center}
     \caption{Effect of Autocratic Tenure on FDI (excluding major Asian economies under autocracy)} 
     \scriptsize
     \begin{tabular}{lcc}
     \hline\hline
		\\
		Estimator: & PCSE & Driscoll-Kraay  \\
		\\
\hline
		\\

				Tenure & 0.538*** & 0.635***\\
				 & (0.189) & (0.204)\\
				Tenure$^2$ & -0.200*** & -0.228***\\
				 & (0.062) & (0.055)\\
				Economic Development & 1.288*** & 1.102***\\
				 & (0.352) & (0.334)\\
				Economic Growth & 0.022*** & 0.033***\\
				 & (0.005) & (0.006)\\
				Market Size & 2.027*** & 1.781***\\
				 & (0.401) & (0.445)\\
				Trade Openness & 0.002 & 0.004\\
				 & (0.003) & (0.002)\\
				BIT & 0.919*** & 1.240***\\
				 & (0.231) & (0.185)\\
				Financial Openness & 0.311*** & 0.340***\\
				 & (0.080) & (0.063)\\
				Resource Rents & 0.162 & 0.217*\\
				 & (0.112) & (0.114)\\
				Intrastate War & -0.398* & -0.640***\\
				 & (0.223) & (0.195)\\
				Domestic Instability & -0.016 & -0.038***\\
				 & (0.014) & (0.012)\\
				Constant &  & -22.819***\\
				 &  & (3.026)\\
				\\
				Observations & 1,995 & 1,995\\
				Number of Countries & 94 & 94\\
				\\
				\hline\hline\\

\multicolumn{3} {l}
{\parbox[h][.42in][c]{2.7in} {\scriptsize{\textbf{Note}: All columns include country-specific fixed effects. (not reported). $^{*}$ p$<$0.10; $^{**}$ p$<$0.05; $^{***}$ p$<$0.01. (two-tailed tests)}}}
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\end{table}









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